Evidence:
Improper Admission of Prior Conviction Evidence
On March 8 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Shawnee District
Court’s decision to allow evidence of a prior conviction to be admitted
based on a “substantially similar” determination was incorrect. State
v. Longstaff, 100,112, 2013 WL 856365 at *9 (Kan. Mar. 8, 2013).
Defendant Robert Longstaff was convicted of rape of a child under 14 and
aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Id. at 1. During trial
the district court granted the state’s request to admit Longstaff’s 1989
conviction for attempted aggravated incest, “claiming that the evidence
showed intent, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or
accident.” Id. at 4. On appeal, Longstaff argued that the district
court erred in admitting the evidence regarding his previous conviction
because such evidence was not “strikingly similar” to the crimes he was
currently charged with so to constitute a signature act. id. at 5–6.
During Longstaff’s trial, K.S.A. 6—455 limited the admission of prior conviction evidence by providing that such evidence is inadmissible unless being used to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. at 6; K.S.A. 60-455. The district court in Longstaff’s case found that the evidence was relevant for showing intent, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident – characterizing the evidence as “sufficiently similar.” Id. at 4.
However, as noted by the supreme court, under Kansas case law the standard for determining the level of similarity required in order for evidence of a prior conviction to be admissible is “strikingly similar”. Id. at 7.
The court acknowledged that there were similarities between Longstaff’s prior conviction and the current charges, but that such similarities were not “striking”:
While we are similarities between the crimes, these similarities do not rise to the level of being so strikingly similar in pattern, or so distinct in method of operation, as to be signature as required [by case law].
Id. at 9.
If you any questions regarding the improper admission of a prior conviction contact Lindsey Erickson or Dionne Scherff, LLC at www.ericksonscherff.com
During Longstaff’s trial, K.S.A. 6—455 limited the admission of prior conviction evidence by providing that such evidence is inadmissible unless being used to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. at 6; K.S.A. 60-455. The district court in Longstaff’s case found that the evidence was relevant for showing intent, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident – characterizing the evidence as “sufficiently similar.” Id. at 4.
However, as noted by the supreme court, under Kansas case law the standard for determining the level of similarity required in order for evidence of a prior conviction to be admissible is “strikingly similar”. Id. at 7.
The court acknowledged that there were similarities between Longstaff’s prior conviction and the current charges, but that such similarities were not “striking”:
While we are similarities between the crimes, these similarities do not rise to the level of being so strikingly similar in pattern, or so distinct in method of operation, as to be signature as required [by case law].
Id. at 9.
If you any questions regarding the improper admission of a prior conviction contact Lindsey Erickson or Dionne Scherff, LLC at www.ericksonscherff.com
